Random Access Protocols for WLANs Based on Mechanism Design by Man Hon Cheung et al.
Random Access Protocols for WLANs
Based on Mechanism Design
Man Hon Cheung, A. Hamed Mohsenian-Rad, Vincent W.S. Wong, and Robert Schober
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
E-mail: {mhcheung, hamed, vincentw, rschober}@ece.ubc.ca
Abstract—In wireless local area networks (WLANs), quality
of service (QoS) can be provided by mapping applications
with different requirements (e.g., delay and throughput) into
one of the available access categories (ACs), as is done in the
IEEE 802.11e standard. With the increasing programmability
of network adapters, a malicious user can strategically declare a
higher AC for its application to gain an unfair share of resources.
This can drastically degrade the network performance and avoid
adequate service distinction among different ACs. In this paper,
we use the technique of mechanism design in game theory to
tackle this problem in WLANs with random access. We propose
to use the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in order to
motivate each station to inform the access point (AP) truthfully,
about the required AC of its application. The AP will then inform
each station about its persistent probability and the price it needs
to pay for the offered service. The result of the allocation of
the persistent probabilities can be used for admission control.
Simulation results show that the use of mechanism design can
lead to a higher aggregate utility and prevents malicious users
from gaining an unfair share of the network bandwidth.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless local area networks (WLANs), the medium
access control (MAC) protocols are important in arbitrating
the access of the shared wireless medium. There are two main
types of MAC protocols in WLANs: scheduling-based (e.g.,
point coordination function (PCF)) and contention-based (e.g.,
distributed coordination function (DCF)). In this paper, we
focus on the study of contention-based MACs as they are
more scalable and inherently more ﬂexible. In contention-
based MACs, users randomly access the shared communica-
tion channel with certain persistent probabilities.
To provide quality of service (QoS) for different applica-
tions, the IEEE 802.11estandard [1] classiﬁes applications into
four different access categories (ACs). Packets in each AC are
placed in a separate queue in the MAC layer. Differentiation
in priorities among the four ACs is achieved through the
use of different channel access parameters (e.g., contention
window), which directly determine the persistent probability
for accessing the shared channel by packets in each AC [2].
The IEEE 802.11e protocol was originally designed for a fully
cooperative network setting, where all stations follow exactly
the operations of the protocol. However, by modifying the
driver of the network adapter, a user can manipulate the MAC
parameters in order to gain an unfair advantage.
Game theory has been shown to be a useful tool in analyzing
the selﬁsh behaviors of users in various networking problems.
In [3], Cagalj et al. formulated carrier sensing multiple access
with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) using game theory.
Both normal-form and repeated-form CSMA/CA games were
formulated and the existence of Nash equilibria was shown for
each game. In [4], Konorski proposed a game-theoretic strat-
egy called CRISP (Cooperation via Randomized Inclination to
Selﬁsh Play) to counteract the selﬁsh behavior of users. In [5],
Cui et al. proposed a comprehensive framework to study non-
cooperative random access games. The Nash equilibria were
characterized for various settings and distributed algorithms
were proposed. However, the issue of service differentiation
among different applications was not addressed in [5].
Papers in [3]–[5] address non-cooperative random access
from the players’ viewpoint, where the key idea is to either
propose strategies to counteract malicious users or to analyze
how non-cooperative users can degrade network performance.
On the other hand, we can take a proactive approach from the
system designer’s point of view and propose proper mech-
anisms to prevent players from misbehaving. For example,
in [6], Nuggehalli et al. proposed an incentive mechanism to
avoid selﬁshness. They showed that under certain conditions,
the users are encouraged to always be truthful on declaring
their ACs. This leads to signiﬁcantly higher throughput as
shown in [6]. Our truthful mechanism design in this paper
is closely related to the results in [6]. However, we consider
a different class of utility functions and mainly focus on
maximizing the aggregate utility across all users aiming to
maximize network social welfare. Our proposed mechanism
design is also different from that in [6] as it is indeed a special
case of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [7], [8].
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the ﬁrst paper to
study VCG mechanism design for random access networks by
taking into account different ACs for different applications. In
summary, the contributions of our work are as follows:
• We consider the problem of assigning persistent prob-
abilities to rational stations in a WLAN to maximize
network social welfare, i.e., the aggregate utility across
all users. We introduce a class of utility functions that
can mathematically model the service requirements for a
wide range of network applications.
• We show that in a non-cooperative random access game
with selﬁsh users, a Nash equilibrium may not exist and
the network has poor performance.• We formulate the VCG mechanism and its corresponding
pricing scheme for random access networks to enforce
truthfulness and cooperation among rational users.
• We consider the computational issues in VCG and show
that for random access networks, implementing VCG
requires solving a complicated non-convex optimization
problem. To tackle the non-convexity,we propose an enu-
meration algorithm such that each iteration only solves
a convex optimization problem. Our algorithm is easy to
implement and is guaranteed to reach the optimal solution
for any choice of the system parameters.
• Simulation results show that our scheme can ensure
achieving maximum aggregate network utility via mech-
anism design. Moreover, service differentiation and QoS
in terms of throughput can be supported.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is described in Section II. The non-cooperative random
access game when the AP offers different ACs is studied in
Section II-C. Our proposed mechanism, which is based on
VCG, is formulated in Section III. The computational issues
of VCG are discussed in Section III-B. Simulation results are
given in Section IV, and the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a WLAN with a single AP and N stations. The set
of stations is denoted by N = {1,2,...,N}. In this paper, we
use terms “stations” and “users” interchangeably. All stations
are one-hop neighbors to the AP. We only consider the uplink
scenario1 where each station i ∈ N can access the shared
medium with a persistent probability pi. Let psucc
i denote the
probability of successful transmission by station i. We have
psucc
i = γi(p) = pi
Q
j∈N\{i}(1 − pj), ∀i ∈ N, (1)
where γi determines the probability of successful transmission
of station i when p = (pi, i ∈ N) is given. Given the nominal
data rate ϕ (e.g., 11 Mbps), the average data rate for user
i is equal to ϕpsucc
i . Stations are assumed to run different
types of applications, each of which may have distinct QoS
requirements. For the ease of exposition, we limit our study to
the case where each station may only run one application at
a time. The proposed framework can be extended to the case
when each station runs multiple applications simultaneously.
A. Utility Function
Let ui(psucc
i ) denote the level of satisfaction station i
achieves when it experiences success probability psucc
i , which
itself depends on all persistent probabilities p = (pi, i ∈ N).
We refer to ui as the utility function corresponding to the
application running on station i. Clearly, utility functions
depend on the QoS requirements of the running applications.
For example, many voice and video applications require a min-
imum level of available bandwidth. If the available bandwidth
drops below the required bandwidth, then the connections
1We notice that malicious users may only affect the performance of uplink
transmissions. In fact, when it comes to the downlink transmissions, the AP
can simply perform scheduling with adequate QoS provisioning.
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Fig. 1. Sample utility functions for four ACs using (2) and (3) with
parameters: K1 = 1, α1 = 1, pcritical
1 = 0.03; K2 = 0.0005, α2 = 5,
pcritical
2 = 0.1; K3 = 2, α3 = 1, pcritical
3 = 0.03; K4 = 0.01, α4 = 3,
pcritical
4 = 0.05.
should be dropped, leading to zero utilities. In this paper,
the utility function ui for user i ∈ N depends on psucc
i ,
as well as αi > 0, pcritical
i ∈ (0,1), and Ki > 1, where
pcritical
i refers to the minimum required psucc
i for the application
to run properly in station i. It is used to mathematically
model various applications (such as voice and video streaming)
which cannot operate if the minimum required data rate is not
provided. Ki and αi determine the amplitude and curvature of
the utility functions, respectively. For utility parameter αi  = 1,
we have
ui(psucc
i ,αi,pcritical
i ,Ki) =
(
Ki(1−αi)−1
h
psucc
i
(1−αi)−pcritical
i
(1−αi)i
, if psucc
i ≥ pcritical
i ,
0, if psucc
i < pcritical
i ,
(2)
and for αi = 1, we have
ui
￿
psucc
i ,1,pcritical
i ,Ki
￿
=
(
Ki log
￿
p
succ
i
pcritical
i
￿
, if psucc
i ≥pcritical
i ,
0, if psucc
i <pcritical
i .
(3)
When Ki = 1 and pcritical
i = 0 in (2) (or pcritical
i = 1 in (3)),
the above utility functions reduce to the well-known α-fair
utility functions [9]. Sample utility functions based on different
choices of parameters are shown in Fig. 1. Notice that each
utility represents a distinct AC.
B. Network Utility Maximization
Given complete knowledge of all parameters and centralized
control of the network, an efﬁcient choice of all persistent
probabilities, i.e., p=(pi,∀i∈N), is characterized as an opti-
mal solution of the network utility maximization problem:
max
p∈P
P
i∈N ui(γi(p),θi), (4)
where
θi =
￿
αi,p
critical
i ,Ki
￿
, ∀i ∈ N, (5)
and
P = {p : 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N} (6)represents the set of feasible persistent probabilities. The
objective function in (4) is also called network social welfare.
We notice that since the utilities are not available to the AP
as they are local to the stations, the AP may solve problem
(4) only after each station i ∈ N declares its type θi.
Clearly, if all stations are truthful, then the obtained vector
of optimal persistent probabilities leads to optimal network
performance. However, if a user i ∈ N is malicious, then it
may declare its type to be ˆ θi  = θi. In that case, the obtained
persistent probabilities cannot be optimal. In fact, the network
performance can be quite poor, as we will see in Section IV.
C. Non-cooperative Random Access Game with Different ACs
Using non-cooperative game theory, we ﬁrst formulate the
described N-user random access system as a ﬁnite N-person
non-cooperative normal-form game (N, Θ, u), where N is
the set of stations (i.e., players), Θ = θ1 × θ2 ×     × θN
is the set of action proﬁles, and u = (u1,u2,...,uN) is the
vector of utility functions for all stations. The action of each
station i∈N is to strategically select its declared type ˆ θi (not
necessarily the same as its true type θi) to maximize its utility.
In other words, given ˆ θ−i as the vector of declared types for
all stations other than station i, station i selects ˆ θi to solve
the following local problem:
max
ˆ θi
ui(γi(p(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i)),θi), (7)
where
p(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i) = argmax
p∈P
P
i∈N ui(γi(p), ˆ θi). (8)
Notice that each station i ∈ N is already aware that the AP
will select the vector of persistent probabilities by solving
problem (8). The complete analysis of game (N, Θ, u) is
not easy in general. However, we can show the following key
result:
Theorem 1: Game (N, Θ, u) has no Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. From
Theorem 1, the non-cooperative game (N, Θ, u), with no
mechanism design, leads to an unstable network. It is also
important to notice that in this game, stations always have
incentive to cheat and declare their types to be different from
their true types. This can be seen by a simple example as in
Fig. 1 with four ACs. In this example, any station which is
running an application of type corresponding to AC 1 has an
incentive to declare its type as AC 3. We further study this
example in detail in Section IV.
III. TRUTHFUL MECHANISM DESIGN FOR WLANS
From the results in Section II-C, it is required to use a
scheme to force the stations be truthful. In this section, we con-
sider mechanism design for this purpose. Mechanism design
is a sub-ﬁeld in microeconomics and game theory that studies
the implementation of an optimal system allocation with self-
interested players, who aim to maximize their own payoffs.
Mechanisms are responsible for the allocation of resources
and incur payment to the players, so as to provide them
with the incentives to declare their private information (i.e.,
their type) truthfully. Groves mechanism and its subfamily
named Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism are among
the most efﬁcient mechanisms that not only tackle dishonesty,
but also guarantee achieving maximum social welfare. The
latter implies achieving the optimum of the network utility
maximization problem in (4).
A. VCG Mechanism Design for Random Access WLANs
For the VCG mechanism [8], given the declared types of
all players ˆ θ = (ˆ θ1,..., ˆ θN), the AP selects the vector of
persistent probabilities according to the optimal solution of
problem (8), and also the payment ti(ˆ θ) for each station i∈N
given by
ti(ˆ θ) =
X
j∈N\{i}
uj(γj(˜ p(ˆ θ)), ˆ θj) −
X
j∈N\{i}
uj(γj(p(ˆ θ)), ˆ θj),
(9)
where
˜ p(ˆ θ) = arg max
p∈P, pi=0
P
j∈N\{i} uj(γj(p), ˆ θj). (10)
Given the vector of payment rules t = (t1,...,tN), each
station needs to pay ti to the AP for relaying its transmitted
packets. Intuitively, VCG selects the payment values such that
it is the best choice for the users to be honest and declare the
correct types. Notice that since each user needs to pay for the
packets it transmits to the AP, the payoff function for each
user i ∈ N is indeed its own surplus
si(ˆ θ,θi) = ui(γi(p(ˆ θ)),θi) − ti(ˆ θ), ∀i ∈ N, (11)
i.e., its utility minus its payment. Notice that since VCG forces
all users to be honest, we indeed have ˆ θi = θi for all users
i ∈ N. Thus, solving problem (8) based on the declared
types sufﬁces to achieve optimal network performance, i.e.,
maximum aggregate network utility.
We are now ready to propose our VCG-based mechanism for
QoS provisioning in WLANs with random access. It includes
the following four key steps:
1) Type declaration: Before each station i ∈ N starts
transmission, it informs the AP about the type ˆ θi.
2) VCG mechanism: Given the declared types ˆ θ, the AP
calculates the persistent probability as in (8). It also
calculates the payments t as in (9).
3) Resource allocation and payment: The obtained vectors
of persistent probabilities and payments are broadcast
by the AP to all stations. Stations may only transmit
based on the persistent probabilities assigned by the AP.
4) Outcome enforcement: If a station i ∈ N is detected2
to transmit with a persistent probability higher than the
persistent probability it is assigned, it will be punished
(e.g., forbid to use the system for a certain amount of
time to offset the advantage it gains from cheating).
The block diagram of the our proposed protocol using VCG
mechanism design is shown in Fig. 2.
2It is easy for the AP to check whether the stations are indeed transmitting
according to the assigned persistent probabilities by listening to the shared
communication medium as explained in [10].￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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Fig. 2. Truthful mechanism design for WLANs with random access.
B. VCG Computations
In order to perform the VCG mechanism, we need to
compute p(ˆ θ) in (8) and ˜ p(ˆ θ) in (10), which are not easy
to solve in general due to non-convexity of the product forms
in (1). We also notice that both problems (8) and (10) are
non-differentiable. In this section, we propose an algorithm
to compute the optimal solutions of problems (8) and (10)
efﬁciently when the utility functions are as in (2) and (3).
First, consider the optimization problem in (8). We can write
this optimization problem in the following form:
max
p
P
i∈N ui(γi(p), ˆ θi)
s.t. 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N.
(12)
Let p∗=p(ˆ θ). Also let psucc
i
∗ = p∗
i
Q
j∈N\{i}(1−p∗
j) denote
the corresponding optimal success probability for station i. We
can show the following lemma which provides us with a way
to compute the allocation of persistent probabilities.
Lemma 1: At any optimal solution of problem (12), for all
i∈N, we have either psucc∗
i > pcritical
i (ˆ θi) or psucc∗
i = 0.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix B. From
Lemma 1, VCG allocates the vector of persistent probabilities
p such that for each station i ∈ N, we have either psucc
i >
pcritical
i (ˆ θi) or psucc
i = 0. We notice that the utility function
ui(γi(p), ˆ θi) is concave for any psucc
i ∈ (pcritical
i (ˆ θi),1]. Thus,
we can reformulate problem (12) to be as follows:
max
p∈P,M⊆N
P
i∈M ui(γi(p), ˆ θi)
s.t. psucc
i > pcritical
i , ∀i ∈ M,
pi = 0, ∀i ∈ N\M.
(13)
In problem (13), we simply divide the set of stations N into
two subsets: subset M and subset N\M. For each station
i∈M, we include the constraint psucc
i > pcritical
i . On the other
hand, for each i∈N\M, we include the constraint pi=0. In
fact, set M acts as an auxiliary variable to model admission
control. Here, M denotes the set of those stations which are
admitted to the system. Constraint psucc
i > pcritical
i implies that
all admitted stations i ∈ M should achieve their required
minimum bandwidth. On the other hand, those stations which
are not admitted to the system are simply assigned zero success
probability and zero data rate. From Lemma 1, optimization
problems (12) and (13) are indeed equivalent.
Next, assume that we ﬁx set M and have the persistent
probabilities as the only optimization variables in problem
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to solve (8) or (12) for the modiﬁed
α-fair utility functions deﬁned in (2) and (3).
1: (Initialization) s = −∞, p∗ = 0, and M∗ = φ.
2: for all subset M of N do
3: M = |M|.
4: if
M−1
qQM
i=1 pcritical
i ≤ 1 −
PM
i=1 pcritical
i then
5: Solve (16) for p.
6: if
P
i∈M ui(γi(p), ˆ θi) > s, then
7: s =
P
i∈M ui(γi(p), ˆ θi), p∗ = p, and M∗ = M.
8: end for
(13). In other words, given set M with size M = |M|, we
solve the following optimization problem:
max
x,p∈P
P
i∈M ui(xi, ˆ θi)
s.t. psucc
i ≥ xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ M,
psucc
i > pcritical
i , ∀i ∈ M,
pi = 0, ∀i ∈ N\M.
(14)
Notice that there are 2N possible choices for set M, i.e., all
possible subsets of set N. In some cases, (e.g., when too many
users are admitted to the network while the required critical
probabilities are high), problem (14) may become infeasible.
Lemma 2: Given set M and the declared vector pcritical =
(pcritical
i , ∀i ∈ M), problem (14) is feasible only if:
M−1
qQM
i=1 pcritical
i ≤ 1 −
PM
i=1 pcritical
i . (15)
The proof of Lemma 2 is in Appendix C. Notice that
the condition in (15) is a necessary condition for feasibility.
Next, by taking the logarithm of both sides of the ﬁrst
constraint in problem (14) and a log change of variables
u′
i(x′
i, ˆ θi) = ui(ex
′
i, ˆ θi) and x′
i = logxi, we reformulate it
into the following equivalent optimization problem for any
utility parameter αi ≥ 1:
max
x
′,p∈P
P
i∈M u′
i(x′
i, ˆ θi)
s.t. logpi +
P
j∈N\{i} log(1−pj) − x′
i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ M,
logpi +
P
j∈N\{i} log(1−pj) >logpcritical
i ,∀i∈M,
pi = 0, ∀i ∈ N\M.
(16)
It is easy to verify that problem (16) is convex. From this,
together with the results from Lemmas 1 and 2, we are now
ready to propose our algorithm to ﬁnd the exact global optimal
solution of problem (8). The algorithm is given in Algorithm
1. A similar algorithm can be given to solve problem (10).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we assess the performance of our proposed
VCG-based mechanism design using MATLAB. We ﬁrst con-
sider a simple WLAN with one AP and four stations. The AP
supports four ACs. For each i = 1,...,4, the ith station runs an
application which belongs to the ith AC. The utility functions
for the four applications are as in Fig. 1. With the use of the
VCG mechanism, we plot the utilities, payments, and surpluses
of the four players in Fig. 3. We consider two cases. In Case I,1 2 3 4
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Fig. 3. Results in a sample network with four stations and four ACs:
(a) Utilities, (b) Payments, and (c) Surpluses of all four stations, using the
proposed VCG-based mechanism in Algorithm 1.
station 1 honestly declares that it supports applications in AC
1 while all other stations are also honest. In Case II, station
1 maliciously declares that it supports applications in AC 4
while other stations are still honest. The results are shown
in Fig. 3, where Cases I and II are represented by the two
bars (with grey and blue colors) at the index of each station.
When all the stations are honest, only AC 2 to AC 4 are given
admission to the system. If station 1 lies about its AC and
declares it as AC 3, station 1 but not station 2 is admitted into
the system. The obtained utility of station 1 increases, while
the utilities of the other stations decrease. However, due to the
VCG mechanism, station 1 is punished with a higher payment
when it lies, as shown in Fig. 3(b). Considering both utility
and payment, the surplus of player 1 indeed decreases if it
lies, as shown in Fig. 3(c). Clearly, this forces user 1 to be
truthful about its type.
Next, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme
in a larger network with 10 stations. We assume that there are
two ACs available: AC 1 and AC 2. For AC 1, the utilities are
characterized by Ki=1, αi=1, and pcritical
i =0.01. For AC 2
the utilities are characterized by Ki=2, αi=1, and pcritical
i =
0.012. Assuming that ﬁve stations run AC 1 applications and
ﬁve stations run AC 2 applications, the throughput of the two
ACs with different numbers of malicious stations with AC 1
(i.e., lower AC) are shown in Fig. 4(a). Here we assume the
nominal data rate ϕ to be 11Mbps. We can see that, without
the use of mechanism design, malicious stations running AC
1 applications will indeed declare themselves as running AC
2 in order to obtain a higher utility. Thus, the AP is unable to
provide differentiated QoS as it was initially intended to do.
On the other hand, when our proposed VCG-based mechanism
is being used, differentiated QoS support is indeed guaranteed
and AC 2 applications are offered better throughput.
We also compare the aggregate network utility (i.e., the
objective function in (4) with different numbers of malicious
stations.) We use Ki = 1 for AC 1, Ki = 30 for AC 2, and
the other parameters are the same as above. Results, when
the number of malicious stations (which are running AC 1
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Fig. 4. Impact of using VCG-based mechanism design in a network with
one AP, ten stations, and two ACs: (a) Aggregate throughput of AC 1 and
AC 2; (b) Aggregate utility, with and without mechanism design (MD). We
assume that the ﬁve stations which are running AC 2 applications are indeed
honest, and then we vary the number of malicious players among those ﬁve
stations which are running AC 1 applications.
applications) varies from 0 to 5, are shown in Fig. 4(b). Recall
that dishonest stations declare themselves as running AC 2
applications, rather than AC 1 applications. As we can see, this
causes deviation from optimal aggregate network utility. The
performance reduction becomes more severe as the number of
malicious stations increase, e.g., resulting in more than 36%
efﬁciency loss in the presence of ﬁve malicious stations. Thus,
using a VCG-based mechanism as in Algorithm 1 is indeed
resulting in a signiﬁcantly better network performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem that a station can
maliciously declare the AC of application that it is supporting
in order to gain a higher utility. This can result in a dras-
tic degradation of network performance and avoid adequate
service distinction among different ACs. We have applied the
VCG mechanism in our random access protocol to motivate
the stations to declare truthfully their ACs of the applications.
The AP then performs admission control, and informs the
stations about their persistent probabilities and the required
payments. We have also studied the computational issue of
the VCG mechanism. The utility functions of the stations are
in the form of modiﬁed α-fair utility functions, which can
represent the utilities of most applications in general, but are
non-convex and non-differentiable. An algorithm is proposed
to compute the persistent probability and the set of admitted
stations for these utility functions. With the use of mechanism
design, our results show that a higher aggregate utility can be
achieved and the QoS in terms of throughput can be supported.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove by contradiction. We ﬁrst notice that the payoff
function for each user i ∈ N is as in (7), where p(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i)
is indeed as in (8). If there exists any Nash equilibrium ˆ θ
∗
=(ˆ θ∗
1,..., ˆ θ∗
N), then for each station i ∈ N, we should have:
ui(γi(p(ˆ θ∗
i , ˆ θ∗
−i)),θi) ≥ ui(γi(p(ˆ θi, ˆ θ∗
−i)),θi), ∀ˆ θi ∈ Θi.
(17)
In that case, we can deﬁne another vector ˆ θ
⋆
such that ˆ θ⋆
i = ˆ θ∗
i
for all i ∈ N\{1} and we have: ˆ θ⋆
1 = (ˆ α⋆
1, ˆ pcritical⋆
1 , ˆ K⋆
1) =
(ˆ α∗
1, ˆ pcritical∗
1 ,β ˆ K∗
1) where β ≫ 1. It is easy to verify that for
the utility functions in (2) and (3), if β → ∞, then the optimal
solution of problem (8) becomes (1,0,...,0). This indicates
that psucc
1 → 1 and psucc
i → 0 for all i ∈ N\{1}. Since the
utility for each user is an increasing function of the probability
of successful transmission of each user, we have:
u1(γ1(p(ˆ θ∗
1, ˆ θ∗
−1)),θ1) < u1(γ1(p(ˆ θ⋆
1, ˆ θ∗
−1)),θ1). (18)
Therefore, (17) does not hold. This contradicts the assumption
that ˆ θ
∗
is a Nash equilibrium. Since we considered any arbi-
trary Nash equilibrium, this implies that the non-cooperative
random access game does not have a Nash equilibrium. In
other words, given any choice of types for the stations, each
station i ∈ N has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to another
type with higher Ki value to be paid off better.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
We ﬁrst ﬁx i ∈ N. Then, we compare the sum of utilities
of the players with the two vectors of persistent probabilities
p′ and p′′, where p′
j = p′′
j, ∀j ∈ N\{i}, p′
i = 0, and p′′
i > 0
such that 0 ≤ psucc”
i ≤ pcritical
i (ˆ θi).
First, we consider the case that ∃j ∈ N\{i} such that
p′
j = p′′
j = 1. Then, we have psucc’
l = psucc”
l = 0, ∀l ∈ N\{j},
which implies that ul(γl(p′), ˆ θl) = ul(γl(p′′), ˆ θl) = 0, ∀l ∈
N\{j}. From p′ and p′′, we have psucc’
j ≥ psucc”
j . Because uj
is an increasing function of psucc
j , we have uj(γj(p′), ˆ θj) ≥
uj(γj(p′′), ˆ θj). As a whole, we have
P
j∈N uj(γj(p′), ˆ θj) ≥
P
j∈N uj(γj(p′′), ˆ θj).
Then, we consider the case p′
j = p′′
j  = 1, ∀j ∈ N\{i}.
In this way, we have p′′
i > 0 such that 0 < psucc”
i ≤
pcritical
i (ˆ θi). From the deﬁnition of the utility functions in
(2) and (3), we have ui(γi(p′), ˆ θi) = ui(γi(p′′), ˆ θi) = 0.
From p′ and p′′, we have psucc’
j ≥ psucc”
j , ∀j ∈ N\{i}.
Because uj is an increasing function of psucc
j , we have
uj(γj(p′), ˆ θj) ≥ uj(γj(p′′), ˆ θj), ∀j ∈ N\{i}. As a whole,
we have
P
j∈N uj(γj(p′), ˆ θj) ≥
P
j∈N uj(γj(p′′), ˆ θj).
From the above two cases, we see that the vector p′′
should never be allocated, because the system is performing
the allocation of persistent probability according to (8). In this
way, we can never have 0 < psucc
i < pcritical
i (ˆ θi) at optimality
of optimization problem (12).
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Problem (13) is feasible if and only if we have
pi
￿Q
j∈M\{i}(1 − pj)
￿
≥ pcritical
i , ∀ i ∈ M. (19)
By manipulating (19), for each user i ∈ M, we have
1 − pi ≤
Q
j∈M(1 − pj)
pcritical
i +
Q
j∈M(1 − pj)
. (20)
Multiplying both sides of the inequality above for all users,
we can ﬁnally come up with the following key condition:
Y
i∈M
(1 − pi) ≤
Y
i∈M
  Q
j∈M(1 − pj)
pcritical
i +
Q
j∈M(1 − pj)
!
(21)
We deﬁne: A(p) =
Q
j∈M(1−pj). Clearly, 0 ≤ A(p) ≤ 1 is
the probability of experiencing an idle time slot. That is, the
probability that no user transmits any packet. Replacing A(p)
in (21), problem (13) is feasible if there exists any value A
between zero and one such that we have:
Q
i∈M(pcritical
i + A) ≤ AM−1. (22)
For the rest of the proof, we show that condition (15) is a
necessary condition for existence of any A such that (22)
holds. We ﬁrst notice that from (22), we need to have
M−1
qQ
i∈M pcritical
i ≤ A. (23)
Condition (22) can be written as the following extended form:
AM +
￿PM
i=1 pcritical
i − 1
￿
AM−1 + Γ(A) ≤ 0, (24)
where Γ(A) is a polynomial in A with degree M −2 and only
non-negative multipliers. Clearly, Γ(A) ≥ 0. Thus, from (24)
we also need to have
A ≤ 1 −
PM
i=1 pcritical
i . (25)
Putting the lower-bound in (23) and the upper-bound in (25)
together, optimization problem (13) is feasible only if there
exists any 0 ≤ A ≤ 1 such that the following holds:
M−1
qQ
i∈M pcritical
i ≤ A ≤ 1 −
PM
i=1 pcritical
i . (26)
Clearly, the above condition holds as long as the upper bound
is greater than or equal to the lower bound. This directly results
in condition (15).
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